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FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION OF HOMOSEXUAL
CONDUCT
INTRODUCrION
The Supreme Court found, in Bowers v. Hardwick,' that ho-
mosexual sodomy is not protected by the Due Process Clause of
the Constitution. The decision provoked outrage in the gay commu-
nity: "Bowers is to the growing gay rights movement what Plessy
v. Ferguson was to the civil rights movement, and what Dred Scott
v. Sandford was to the abolitionists. Each of these decisions re-
flects the Court's failure to recognize the equal humanity and
personhood of members of a minority group."2
However, a finding that homosexual sodomy is unprotected by
the Due Process Clause does not necessarily mean that homosexual
conduct is without constitutional protection. For example, Cass
Sunstein has asserted that, despite Bowers, the Equal Protection
Clause protects both homosexual orientation and homosexual con-
duct.3 According to Sunstein:
Each constitutional provision must be taken on its own. It
would hardly be odd to find that one constitutional provi-
sion invalidates practices about which another provision has
478 U.S. 186 (1986).
z David Cole & William N. Eskridge, Jr., From Hand-Holding to Sodomy: First
Amendment Protection of Homosexual (Expressive) Conduct, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
319, 323 (1994) (citations omitted).
3 See Cass R. Sunstein, Sexual Orientation and the Constitution: A Note on the
Relationship Between Due Process and Equal Protection, 55 U. Cm. L. REV. 1161, 1166
n.26 (1988). Sunstein stated:
[A] statute discriminating on the basis of sexual orientation should be subject
to special scrutiny under the Equal Protectio Clause; the same considerations
also support the view that statutes should be subject to such scrutiny if they
discriminate on the basis of participation in homosexual acts, though I do not
argue that point in detail here.
Id.
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nothing to say. The Fourth Amendment, for example, does
not disable the state from regulating activities that the First
Amendment protects, and vice versa. The fact that the
Fourth Amendment does not prevent the state from regulat-
ig all speech-related activities could not plausibly be a
reason to immunize speech from special First Amendment
scrutiny.4
This Note argues that, in fact, the First Amendment provides
Constitutional protection for homosexual conduct. It argues this
proposition in three parts. First, it looks at the protections offered
sexual speech in public and private contexts and at the current test
used to analyze the extent to which First Amendment protection is
offered to expressive conduct, such as sexual conduct. Second, the
Note analyzes the competing public and private interests in prohib-
iting or protecting private homosexual conduct and weighs those
interests against each other. Third, the Note argues that, given this
analysis, the state's interest in prohibiting private homosexual con-
duct is insufficient to justify prohibiting that expressive conduct.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Sexual Speech and the Public v. Private Dichotomy
Historically, public speech has received greater First Amend-
ment protection than private speech.' This has largely been due to
the kinds of philosophies which have been brought to bear to
justify freedom of expression.
The oldest philosophical justification for free speech contends
that speech must be protected because only the competition of
varied points of view in the "marketplace of ideas" distinguishes
truth from error.6 This philosophy advocates that "though all the
winds of doctrine were let loose to play upon the earth, so Truth
be in the field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to
misdoubt her strength. Let her and Falsehood grapple; who ever
knew Truth put to worse in a free and open encounter." Its most
eloquent expression as a Constitutional doctrine was voiced by
4 Id. at 1167.
s. See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 345-47.
6 See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSMIONAL LAW § 12-1, at 785-86 (2d
ed. 1988) (summarizing the position briefly).
" JOHN MILTON, Areopagitica, in JOHN MILTON: COMPLETE POEMS AND MAJOR
PROSE 717, 746 (1957); see also John Milton, On Liberty, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN
STUART MILL 185, 203-48 (1961) (advocating free speech as a way to determine truth).
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Justice Holmes:
[W]hen men have realized that time has upset many fight-
ing faiths, they may come to believe even more than they
believe the very foundations of their own conduct that the
ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas-that the. best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market; and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out. That, at any rate, is the
theory of our Constitution.!
Such a philosophy protects speech because doing so protects the
search for truth.
A similar philosophy argues that speech must be protected
because free speech is essential to democracy.9 The best-known
advocate of this philosophy, Alexander Meikeljohn, uses the New
England town meeting as a paradigm of democracy.'0 In such a
system:
[Cionflicting views may be expressed, must be expressed,
not because they are valid, but because they are relevant. If
they are responsibly entertained by anyone, we, the voters,
need to hear them. When a question of policy is "before
the house," free men choose to meet it not with their eyes
shut, but with their eyes open. To be afraid of ideas, any
idea, is to be unfit for self-government."
Such a philosophy protects speech because doing so is necessary
for democracy to function.
Both theories emphasize the value of public speech: speech in
' Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see
also David M. Rabban, The Emergence of Modern First Amendment Doctrine, 50 U. Cm.
L. REV. 1205 (1983) (describing the emergence of the Chafee-Holmes-Brandeis line of
First Amendment thought); David M. Rabban, The First Amendment in Its Forgotten
Years, 90 YALE LJ. 514 (1981) (sketching the pre-World War I free speech views of
certain judges and scholars).
9- See JOHN H. ELY, DEmOCRACY AND DISTRUST 105-34 (1980); ALEXANDER
MEImKLJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SEFGOVERNMENT (1948); ALEXANDER
MEIIUEOHN, POLrICAL FREEDOM (1960) [hereinafter MEIKLEJOHN, POLrICAL FREEDOM];
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FouND.
RES. J. 521; Harry Kalven, Jr., The New York Tunes Case: A Note on "The Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. Cr. REv. 191; Alexander Meiklejohn, The
First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REv. 245 [hereinafter Meiklejohn, Abso-
lute].
'0 See MEIKLEOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM, supra note 9, at 24-28.
"" ld. at 28.
1998]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
the public marketplace or in the public forum. For this reason,
public speech has become the paradigm of that speech which is
given the greatest First Amendment protection.'2
Sexual expression, however, enjoys more private protection
than public protection.'3 Generally, sexually explicit expression
which is not obscene and does not involve minors is protected by
the First Amendment.' 4 However, public sexual expression which
involves nudity may be prohibited by laws which prohibit public
nudity generally, as long as those laws are not aimed at limiting
sexual expression in particular."5 Also, the Court has found that
"z See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 345. The authors note, however, that First
Amendment protection may also frequently extend to public speech for a more mundane
reason: It is far more likely to be widely noticed, easily investigated, and successfully
prosecuted than private speech. See id.
' According to David Cole:
[P]ublic representations of sex are more subject to regulation than sexual behav-
ior. This reverses the usual relationship between conduct and expression. While
it is illegal, for example, to rob a bank, it is not illegal to publish a novel or
make a movie about robbing a bank.. .. As construed by the Supreme Court,
the First Amendment not only fails to protect representations of illegal sexual
conduct; it permits the state to ciminalize the representation of sexual conduct
that is itself legal to engage in. Obscenity doctrine, for example, permits the
proscription of prurient depictions of "patently offensive" sexual conduct, wheth-
er or not the underlying conduct is (or could be) unlawful. Similarly, while
private nude dancing has never been banned, its public display may be exten-
sively regulated.
David Cole, Playing by Pornography's Rules: The Regulation of Sexual Expression, 143
U. PA. L. REV. 111, 113-14 (1994).
See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (discussing statute
that prohibited transportation of sexually explicit material involving minors); Miller v.
California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (invalidating statute that prohibited mailing of sexually
explicit, but not necessarily obscene, material); see also Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indi-
ana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989) (noting that non-obscene, pornographic material is protected). For
limits as regards sexual expression by minors, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747
(1982) and American Library Ass'n v. Reno, 33 F.3d 78 (D.C. Cir. 1994). Obscene mate-
rial is not protected by the First Amendment; it may be regulated or prohibited. See
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993). The test for obscenity is:
(a) whether the "average person, applying contemporary community standards" would
find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically
defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as a whole,
lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller, 413 U.S. at 24 (citation omitted). Also, material which is not obscene when dis-
tributed to adults may be obscene when distributed to minors, under a statute which
makes it an offense to knowingly distribute to minors material "harmful to minors." See
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas United Artists Corp., 390 U.S. 676 (1968);
Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
'" See, e.g., Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (deciding that public
indecency statute aimed at adult entertainment establishment did not violate the First
Amendment).
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public sexual expression may be regulated by laws directed at
suppressing undesirable secondary effects, such as neighborhood
deterioration, as long as the law is not directed at suppressing the
sexual expression. 6 Further, "indecent" material, including inde-
cent sexual expression, may be regulated in the broadcast media
even when it is not obscene.17
It is even possible that public sexually explicit expression, as
expression, may enjoy less protection than other protected speech.
A plurality, in Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.,8 found
sexually explicit expression to be of lesser value than other protect-
ed expression. 9 The Court stated that "society's interest in pro-
tecting [such speech] is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude
than the interest in untrammeled political debate." 2 However, this
may be because, as is the case with commercial speech, the sourc-
es of this expression "do not profess to convey their own personal
messages."' A different plurality, in Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc.," found nude dancing to be "within the outer perimeters of
the First Amendment," but "only marginally so."
Public sexual expression which is merely "offensive" is gener-
ally protected. In such a case, "the burden is generally on the
observer or listener to avert his eyes or plug his ears."24 But even
merely offensive expression may be regulated if it is part of "an
assault upon individual privacy by publication in a manner so
obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to
avoid exposure to it."
Most of these limits on protection of sexual expression recede
as that expression becomes more private. The possession and use
of even obscene material is protected in the home. In Stanley v.
Georgia,' the Court held that the government's valid interest in
' See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986) (holding that an
ordinance restricting location of adult movie theatres comports with the First Amendment).
'7 See Federal Communications Comm'n v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 740
(1978) (finding that "indecent" material is material which does not conform to accepted
standards of morality).
IS 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
,' See id. at 70.
SId.
2,. Id. at 78 n.2 (Powell, J., concurring).
" 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
ld. at 566.
2 TtIBE, supra note 6, § 12-19, at 948 (citing Erznoznik v. Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205, 211, 212 (1975); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
2- Redrup v. New York, 386 U.S. 767, 769 (1967).
m 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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regulating obscenity could not invade the privacy of the home.'
The Court stated that "[ilf the First Amendment means anything, it
means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in
his own house, what books he may read or what films he may
watch.' '" Any right which a state might assert to protect the
individual's mind from obscenity is utterly inconsistent with the
First Amendment, even if the material is devoid of any ideological
content.29 According to the Court, our founders "sought to protect
Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to
be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized man."3
Greater protection for private sexual expression than for public
sexual expression makes little sense if justification for freedom of
speech rests on protecting the "marketplace of ideas" or protecting
democratic processes. David Cole, puzzling over the extension of
greater protection to private sexual expression, observed:
The First Amendment protects public values; one of its
central purposes is to protect an "uninhibited, robust, and
wide-open" public debate....
Public sexual expression, however, receives none of this
protection: indeed, the more sexual expression seeks to
enter the public arena, the more the Court sanctions its
suppression. Social regulation of sexual expression is driven
by a moral judgment that certain sexual expression should
remain a private matter. Yet the First Amendment generally
- See id. at 568.
21 Id. at 565.
'9 See id.
' Id. at 564 (quoting Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting)). The mere possession of pornography which involves minors is not consti-
tutionally protected; this is a consequence, however, of protecting minors from sexual
exploitation, distinguishing it from private possession of other sexual materials. See
Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990) (upholding Ohio statute that banned the possession
and viewing of child pornography); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982) (holding
state statute prohibiting persons from knowingly promoting a "sexual performance" by a
child under sixteen years old constitutional). Note that even though the government may
not prohibit the possession and use of obscene material in the home, it may prohibit
transportation of that material to the home. The Supreme Court has consistently upheld
laws barring distribution and importation of obscene material, even when intended for
private, personal use. See United States v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (affirming a statute
barring obscenity intended for personal use when it passes through channels of interstate
commerce); United States v. 12, 200-FL Reels of Super 8mm. Film, 413 U.S. 123 (1973)
(affirming a statute barring importation of obscenity for personal use); United States v.
Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 352 (1971) (affirming a statute barring mailing of obscenity be-
tween consenting adults).
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precludes the regulation of expression on any moral
grounds and holds especially suspect the particular moral
judgment enforced here: namely, that speech should be
selectively suppressed precisely because it has been ex-
pressed in public. The moral judgment that drives the sexu-
al speech doctrine is thus doubly antithetical to the First
Amendment tradition.
Indeed, the matter is even more puzzling than Cole described. If
sexual expression makes no contribution to "uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open debate," then why must the government refrain
from punishing the possession and use of obscenity in the home?
Surely, such protection cannot be justified by a philosophy of
protecting the marketplace of ideas nor one of protecting democrat-
ic processes. 2 If protection of private sexual expression is not
derived from these philosophies, then from what philosophy is that
protection derived?
One answer is a philosophy of self-expressionself-fulfill-
ment. 33 Such a philosophy values individual expression as an end
in itself and as a means to personal development:
Those who won our independence believed that the final
end of the State was to make men free to develop their
2, Cole, supra note 13, at 152-53.
32 Alexander Meiklejohn argues that self-education in all forms, including education in
art and belles-lettres, contributes to intelligent voting. See Meiklejobn, Absolute, supra
note 9, at 263. However, it is difficult to see how obscene material, which by definition
is without socially redeeming value, falls within "the range of human communications
from which the voter derives the knowledge, intelligence, sensitivity to human values: the
capacity for sane and objective judgment which, so far as possible, a ballot should ex-
press." Id. at 256. If the material were capable of enhancing "sane and objective judg-
ment," it could not be described as obscene. The question remains: Why does private
obscene expression enjoy any First Amendment protection?
' For descriptions, analyses, and criticisms of varieties of justifications for First
Amendment protection based on a philosophy of self-fulfillment/self expression, see C.
EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN FREEDOM AND LniERTY OF SPEECH (1989), RONALD DwoRKIN,
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY (1977), MARTIN H. REDiSH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS (1984), C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of
Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978), C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the
Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1981), Meir Dan-Cohen,
Freedoms of Collective Speech: A Theory of Protected Communications by Organizations,
Communities, and the State, 79 CAL. L. REV. 1229 (1991), Thomas L Emerson, Toward a
General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877 (1963), Martin H. Redish,
Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A Reply to Professor Baker, 130
U. PA. L. REV. 678 (1982), and Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U.
PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). For a discussion of the similarities and differences between the
"classical" view of the First Amendment and the self-fulfillment/self-expression model, see
GERALD GuNnrimR, CONSTITUTrONAL LAw 998-1002 (12th ed. 1991).
38719981
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
faculties, and that in its government the deliberative forces
should prevail over the arbitrary. They valued liberty both
as an end and as a means. They believed liberty to be the
secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of liber-
ty?
4
Simply, expression should be protected not merely because doing
so protects important public values, but also because "no other
approach would comport with the premise of individual dignity and
choice upon which our political system rests."35 Moreover, protec-
tion grounded in a recognition of the value of individual self-ex-
pression does not protect speech merely because it is a vehicle for
ideas: "We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while
solicitous of the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or
no regard for that emotive function which, practically speaking,
may often be the more important element of the overall message
sought to be communicated." In sum, discourse ought to be con-
sidered for protection to the extent that it is heartfelt expression or
an exploration or construction of individuality.
First Amendment protection for expression grounded in a phi-
losophy of self-fulfilment/self-expression is a necessary comple-
ment to protection based on a philosophy of idea-testing or demo-
cratic action. We cannot limit First Amendment protection only to
speech which a single philosophy finds worthy: "Any adequate
conception of freedom of speech must instead draw upon several
strains of theory in order to protect a rich variety of expressional
modes."37 First Amendment theory must explain which expression
is worth protecting in all of human experience, not merely within
some artificially crabbed conception of humanity's range. A theory
of the First Amendment which protects only public or only private
expression betrays human complexity, and a theory which finds
nothing in intimate life worth sheltering from the hand of the state
is either dangerous or silly."5 For these reasons, First Amendment
protection based on a philosophy of self-fulffllment/self-expression
is a natural complement to protection springing from traditional
philosophies which defend public communication.
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
31 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971) (Marlan, J.).
I ld. at 26.
STRBE, supra note 6, § 12-1, at 789.
See, e.g., Cynthia L. Estlund, Speech on Matters of Public Concern: The Perils of
an Emerging First Amendment Category, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1, 40-46 (1990) (exam-
ining the problems of a regime which requires that speech involve "matters of public
concern" to warrant First Amendment protection).
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Greater protection for private than public sexual expression
makes more sense if that protection is grounded in a philosophy of
self-flffillment/self-expression. Public acts, such as graduations and
other public rituals, can profoundly shape or announce who we are,
but they announce a public persona that we share with other partic-
ipants in the ritual.39 Many intimate acts, however, such as acts of
self-disclosure ° and intimate play," are individuating acts which
reveal or explore the singular mystery of who we are. Indeed,
intimate interactions are the predominant means by which we cre-
ate, discover, and project our selves.42
Sex is the ultimate intimacy, whether playful or passionate,
contentious or caring. Intimacy is important to fulfilling sex partly
because we send sexual messages by nuanced sounds, facial ex-
pressions, and touches whose interpretation deepens as we come to
more intimate knowledge about our lover.43 Further, nonverbal
acts, such as sexual acts, seem more intimate because they are
especially effective in communicating feelings, rather than in com-
municating more impersonal cognitions." Finally, the intimate
proximity of sex is rich in emotional leakage, revelatory of feelings
which the lover may be trying to hide or cannot express verbal-
' See, e.g., James F. Walsh, Jr., Rhetoric in the Conversion of Maoist Insurgency
Cadres: Rhetoric and the Social Component of Conversion in Radical Social Movements,
WORLD COMM., Spring 1985, at 27, 33-34 (describing Maoist insurgents' use of public
ceremonies as part of process for altering the self).
' See, e.g., B. Davidson et al., Affective Self-disclosure and Marital Adjustment: A
Test of Equity Theory, 45 1. MARRIAGE & FAM. 93 (1983) (examining the role of self-
disclosure in marriage); Lawrence R. Wheeless, A Follow-Up Study of the Relationships
Among Trust, Disclosure, and Interpersonal Solidarity, 4 HuM. COMM. RES. 4 (1978)
(examining the role of disclosure in close relationships).
" See Leslie A. Baxter, Forms and Functions of Intimate Play in Personal Relation-
ships, 18 HuM. COMM. REs. 336 (1992) (analyzing the contributions of intimate play in
developing and maintaining relationships).
' For a sampling of general theoretical perspectives on the development, understand-
ing, and projection of self in interpersonal interaction, see JOHN P. HEwITr, SELF AND
SOCIETY: A SYMBOLIC INTERACTION=ST SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY (3d ed. 1984); MICHAEL
LEWIs & JEANNE BRooKs-GuNN, SOCIAL COGNITION AND THE ACQUISITION OF SELF
(1979); Daryl J. Bern, Self-Perception Theory, 6 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSY-
CHOL. 1 (1972); Charles Horton Cooley, Looking-Glass Self, in SYMBouc INTERACTION: A
READER IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 231 (Jerome G. Manis & Bernard N. Meltzer eds., 2d
ed. 1972); and Andrew J. Lock, The Role of Relationships in Development: An Introduc-
tion to a Series of Occasional Articles, 3 J. SOC. & PERS. RELATIONSHIPS 89 (1986).
4, See DOMINIC A. INFANTE ET AL., BUILING COMMUNICATION THEORY 267-68 (2d
ed. 1993) (regarding our cultural expectation that sexual messages be expressed non-ver-
bally); see also IRWIN ALTMAN & DALMAS A. TAYLOR, SOCIAL PENETRATON: THE DE-
VELOPMENT OF INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS (1973) (describing an evolution of relation-
ships in which accuracy of prediction and interpretation of meaning in behavior increases
with intimacy).
' See INFANTE ET AL, supra note 43, at 248.
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ly.45 The subtlety, emotionality, and seeming transparency of sexu-
al expression make it a unique ground for creating, finding, and
revealing self.
Protection of private sexual expression does not require any
special protection for public sexual expression. Indeed, one may
argue that certain kinds of public sexual expression deserve little or
no constitutional protection because they are public. Harry Clor, for
example, contends that "the essence of the obscene is its invasion
of privacy."' According to Clor, "obscenity consists in making
public that which is private; it consists in an intrusion upon inti-
mate physical processes and acts or physical-emotional states."'' A
violation of intimacy is obscene because it reveals what should be
shared with one or a few close persons to the harsh light of public
scrutiny, often making the private self which lies revealed seem too
silly or too tawdry to be worth protecting. Any public sexual ex-
pression which cheapens sexual intimacy, thus devaluing the self-
fulfillment and self-expression possible in sex, cannot appeal to a
philosophy of self-fulfillment and self-expression for protection.
Indeed, some argue that a public sexual taboo is an essential
part of private sex as we know it: "[T]he public/private line...
is... central to maintaining the mystery, sanctity, and (indeed)
sexiness of sex." There may be some truth to this argument. But
if we choose to limit the public appearance of sexual expression,
then it becomes doubly important to protect sexual expression in
private life. Otherwise, we risk diminishing a unique and irreplace-
able ground for revealing and finding the self.
The philosophy by which sexual expression is protected is an
important consideration in deciding whether any particular sexual
act is protected and to what extent it is protected. However, sexual
communication is more than just speech. Sexual acts fall within the
rubric of "expressive conduct," a kind of communication which is
speech plus a physical component which may be regulated for
reasons having nothing to do with the act's semantic component.
Consequently, an analysis of the protection extended to some sexu-
al act must be shaped by the Court's approach to analyzing expres-
sive conduct generally.
See id. at 250, 253.
' HARRY M. CLOR, OBSCENnIY AND PUBLIC MORALrrY 225 (1969).
47. Id.
' Cole & Eskridge, supra note 2, at 36. The assumptions underlying this view and
some of its implications is the theme of Cole, supra note 13.
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B. First Amendment Analysis of Expressive Conduct
Some nonverbal conduct is considered "expressive conduct" or
"symbolic speech," and it is given the constitutional protection of
the First Amendment. Such conduct, to the extent that it is com-
municative, may be protected under the First Amendment.49 For
example, conduct such as "the wearing of an armband for the
purpose of expressing certain views is ... closely akin to 'pure
speech."' ° Courts have protected a wide variety of expressive
conduct: Stromberg v. California5 ' struck down a law which
barred display of the Communist flag, West Virginia State Board of
Education v. Barnette" protected a refusal to salute the American
flag, NAACP v. Button" found a lawsuit to be a "form of politi-
cal expression,"'  Brown v. Louisiand5  extended First Amend-
ment protection to a sit-in, Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham56
determined that "picketing and parading [are] ... methods of
expression, entitled to First Amendment protection," Spence v.
Washington' allowed a protestor to attach a peace symbol to a
flag, and Texas v. Johnson59 upheld the burning of an American
flag as a form of expression.
The lines between speech, expressive conduct, and conduct
which is not expressive are not always clear.' To some extent, all
" See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943) (Jack-
son, J.) (finding symbolic speech to be "a primitive but effective way of communicating
ideas").
I Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 505 (1969).
. 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
52 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
5 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
aId. at 429.
383 U.S. 131 (1966).
394 U.S. 147 (1969).
SId. at 152.
418 U.S. 405 (1974) (per curiam).
" 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
See Mabey v. Reagan, 537 F.2d 1036, 1045 (9th Cir. 1976) (separating conduct
and speech requires an "analytical scalpel"); Women Strike for Peace v. Morton, 472 F.2d
1273, 1282 (D.C. Cir. 1972) ("[]irtually all communication-from the faintest whisper to
a large demonstration-is a compound of 'speech' and 'conduct.'"); TRIBE, supra note 6,
§ 12-7, at 827 ("All communication except perhaps that of the extrasensory variety in-
volves conduct."); John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Cate-
gorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1482, 1495
(1975) ("The ... Court thus quite wisely dropped the 'speech-conduct' distinction as
quickly as it had picked it up."); Louis Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term-Fore-
word: On Drawing Lines, 82 HARV. L. REV. 63, 79-80 (1968) (cautioning against draw-
ing rigid lines between speech and other symbolic conduct); Laurie Magid, First Amend-
ment Protection of Ambiguous Conduct, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 467 (1984) (arguing that the
distinction between speech and conduct is unworkable). Compare Cox v. Louisiana, 379
1998]
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human conduct communicates, since all acts hint at the attitudes of
the actors who performed them.6
Yet, the Court does not regard all conduct as constitutionally-
protected speech.62 In deciding whether it should extend First
Amendment protection to expressive conduct, the Court uses a two-
step analysis of that conduct.
First, it asks whether the conduct is expressive. Specifically,
the Court asks whether the conduct is intended to communicate or
likely to be understood as communicative.63 As a rule, the Court
extends First Amendment protection to conduct only if the actor
intended the conduct as a message:
Whatever else may or may not be true of speech, as an
irreducible minimum it must constitute a communication.
That, in turn, implies both a communicator and a
communicatee-a speaker and an audience.... [W]ithout
an actual or potential audience there can be no first amend-
ment speech right. Nor may the first amendment be in-
yoked if there is an audience but no actual or potential
"speaker... ." [U]nless there is a human communicator
intending to convey a meaning by his conduct, it would be
odd to think of it as conduct constituting a communication
U.S. 559 (1965) (holding a statute banning demonstration near a courthouse constitutional),
with Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (holding common law crime of
breach of the peace unconstitutionally vague). For a comparison of the two cases, see also
Harry Kalven, Jr., The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 SUP. Cr.
REV. 1.
6 . For the most recent round of debate regarding the extent to which human action
generally can be regarded as communication, see Peter A. Andersen, When One Cannot
Not Communicate: A Challenge to Motley's Traditional Communication Postulates, 42
COMM. STUD. 309 (1991), Janet Beavin Bavelas, Behaving and Communicating: A Reply
to Motley, 54 W.J. SPEECH CoMM. 593 (1990), Theodore Clevenger, Jr., Can One Not
Communicate? A Conflict of Models, 42 CoMM. STUD. 340 (1991), and Michael T. Mot-
ley, On Whether One Can (Not) Communicate: An Examination via Traditional Communi-
cation Postulates, 54 W.J. SPEECH CoMM. 1 (1990).
While it is arguable that all conduct could be construed as speech, doing so quick-
ly leads to a reductio ad absurdum. See Stephen L. Carter, Does the First Amendment
Protect More Than Free Speech?, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 871, 871-72 (1992) (illus-
trating the possibility and absurdity of extending free speech to conduct generally). Ac-
cording to Louis Henkin, "[t]he meaningful constitutional distinction is not between speech
and conduct, but between conduct that speaks, communicates, and other kinds of conduct.
If it is intended as expression, if in fact it communicates, especially if it becomes a com-
mon comprehensible form of expression, it is 'speech.'" Henkin, supra note 60, at 79-80.
63 See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 404 (1989); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S.
405, 409 (1974).
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protected by the first amendment."
Since a great deal of conduct can have some communicative di-
mension to it, this is a low threshold.' However, if the Court
finds the conduct is not expressive, then the First Amendment is
not implicated.'
Second, if the conduct is found to be expressive, the Court
applies the following test:
[G]overnment regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government; if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if
the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to
the furtherance of that interest.67
Expressive conduct "remains conduct, subject to regulation by the
state."s If the government's interest in the regulation is related to
the expressive element of the conduct, then the regulation will
probably be invalidated. Generally, "[c]ourts will review even inci-
dental infringements carefully for any constitutional infirmity." If
infringement on expression is an incidental effect of the regulation,
then the regulation may be sustained. The current version of the
test balances the state's interest in regulations which impinge upon
expression against the actor's interest in the expression, and it
considers whether there are alternatives available to either party.71
" Mellville B. Nimmer, The Meaning of Symbolic Speech Under the First Amend-
ment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29, 36 (1973).
' See Cole & Eskridge, supra note 2.
66 Compare Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 565 (1991) (holding that
erotic dancing is communicative), with Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24-25 (1989)
(holding that purely recreational dancing is not communicative, so long as its goal is
nothing more than calisthenic).
" United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 848 (2d Cir. 1977)
(Meskill, J., dissenting); see also Mark D. Schneider, Note, Peaceful Labor Picketing and
the First Amendment, 82 COLUM. L. REv. 1469, 1488-95 (1982) (separating the physical
and communicative aspects of picketing).
6 Brent Hunter Allen, The First Amendment and Homosexual Expression: The Need
for an Expanded Interpretation, 47 VND. L. REv. 1073, 1086 (1994); see also supra
notes 51-59 and accompanying text.
' See, e.g., Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293
(1984) (rejecting protection for sleeping in a public park as expressive protest of the
plight of the homeless); O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (upholding a law prohibiting the
burning of draft cards); Yurkew v. Sinclair, 495 F. Supp. 1248, 1254 (D. Minn. 1980)
(rejecting protection for tattooing in public as expressive conduct), affd mem., 657 F.2d
274 (8th Cir. 1981).
71 See Clark, 468 U.S. at 293 (noting that content-neutral restrictions must be 'justi-
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In applying the test, courts regard some expressive conduct as
being of "slight social value" even if it is not characterized as
"fighting words," obscene, or illegal advocacy. For example, Young
v. American Mini Theatres, Inc.' found non-obscene sexual mate-
rials to be of relatively slight social value:73 "[T]here is surely a
less vital interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on
the borderline between pornography and artistic expression than in
the free dissemination of ideas of social and political signifi-
cance... . " In such cases, regulators invoke the state's police
power to protect public health, safety, and morals; the relatively
slight value of the speech or expressive conduct which is curtailed
is unable to withstand the interest which the state has invoked.75
A philosophy of self-fulfillment/self-expression urges that sexu-
al expression be protected as unique expressive conduct for creat-
ing, finding, and revealing self. If homosexual conduct is protected
under that philosophy, regulations limiting or banning such conduct
must not intentionally regulate the expressive aspects of the con-
duct, must be narrowly tailored to. further some significant govern-
mental interest, and must leave open ample alternative channels for
the communication. In practice, the interest of the government in
regulating the non-expressive, communicative aspects of the con-
duct must outweigh the private interest in the communication.
Otherwise, the regulation of the conduct must be overturned. The
following section shows that laws which limit or ban homosexual
sodomy fail these tests.
IHl. MORALUTY V. IDENTTY: THE INSUFFCIENCY OF STATE
INTERESTS IN BANNING HOMOSExUAL SODOMY
Laws limiting homosexual sodomy fail an "expressive conduct"
analysis. Even making the dubious assumptions that such laws do
not intentionally regulate the expressive aspects of the conduct, 6
fled without reference to the content of the regulated speech .... narrowly tailored to
serve a significant governmental interest, and ... leave open ample alternative channels
for communication of the information").
7- 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
71 See id. at 71.
74 Id. at 61; see also City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41, 49 n.2
(1986) (noting that "it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of expres-
sion is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled polit-
ical debate" (quoting Young, 427 U.S. at 70)).
71 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 61 (1973) (noting "the social
interest in order and morality") (quoting Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
572 (1942)).
' See generally Cole & Eskridge, supra note 2, for an argument that, in fact, such
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and that the laws leave open ample alternative channels for the
communication, it is impossible to determine whether or not the
regulation is narrowly tailored because it is unclear what the
government's interest is in regulating the conduct. Generally, advo-
cates justify laws banning homosexual sodomy by reference to the
state's interest in morality. But what the nature of this moral inter-
est is, how it is justified, or what weight it ought to be given
remains unexplained. Further, even the slight attempts made to
describe and justify the state's moral interest in banning homosexu-
al conduct make it clear that the state's interest is far outweighed
by the actors' interests in engaging in the conduct.
A. The State's Interest in Morality
In one sense, -debate as to whether law may be based on mo-
rality is futile, since even if we decide for the negative, morality
will necessarily insinuate itself into law. According to Calvin
Woodard-
[E]ven where the authority of the law-giver has been un-
questioned and unquestionable, the meaning of the promul-
gated law has inevitably remained, in certain circumstances,
unclear.... [Tihe interpreters (or exegetes) of law inevi-
tably infuse into law their own sense of what the law
ought to be, and how it should be interpreted. They there-
by add a moral gloss to the blackest black-letter.7
To admit that moral precepts will guide selection of competing
interpretations of black letter law differs from admitting that some-
thing should be black letter law because it is a moral precept. It is
the latter half of the antithesis with which we are concerned here.
The weight which should be given the state's interest in en-
forcing morality in any balancing test must depend on the nature
of that interest. There are two competing theories of the nature of
the state's interest in legislating morality in Supreme Court juris-
prudence.7
laws are aimed directly at the expressive aspects of the conduct.
" Calvin Woodard, Thoughts on the Interplay Between Morality and Law in Modern
Legal Thought, 64 NoTRE DAME L. REV. 784, 785 (1989); see also Stephen Macedo,
Morality and the Constitution: Toward a Synthesis for "Earthbound" Interpreters, 61 U.
C. L. REv. 29, 29 (1992) ("Morality must play some role in legal interpretation....
[Tihe question there is not whether moral theory but which moral theory."); Don Welch,
The State As a Purveyor of Morality, 56 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 540, 542-46 (1988) (argu-
ing that the state inevitably legislates morality).
' This analysis is based on the discussion in D. Don Welch, Legitimate Government
Purposes and State Enforcement of Morality, 1993 U., ILL. L. REV. 67, 86-91.
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1. The Teleological Position
The first position, the teleological position, holds that govern-
ment has an interest in legislating morality because public, immoral
behavior injures the general welfare. According to Chief Justice
Burger.
The issue in this context goes beyond whether someone, or
even the majority, considers the conduct depicted as
"wrong" or "sinful." The States have the power to make a
morally neutral judgment that public exhibition of obscene
material, or commerce in such material, has a tendency to
injure the community as a whole, to endanger the public
safety, or to jeopardize ... the States' "right... to main-
tain a decent society."79
A line of cases refers to the "social interest in order and morality"
as a legitimate justification for legislation.'
In these cases, the behavior is harmful partly because it is
public:
Although the legitimate interests of the state include the
interest of the public in the "quality of life," Burger's
distinction between public and private activity and his focus
on the undesirable consequences of the behavior in question
established a legitimate purpose quite different than simply
enforcing the community's morality. According to Burger, a
man may be entitled to read an obscene book in his room
or expose himself indecently there. It is when he demands
to do so in "public places" that are "accessible to all" that
he affects "the world about the rest of us" and his action
legitimately becomes a state concern.8'
In each case, the theory is that the effect of public, immoral be-
havior is damage to the general welfare. Legislation seeking to
prevent this effect is justified. 2
-' Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 69 (quoting in part Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S.
184, 199 (1964) (Warren, CJ., dissenting)).
See id. at 61; Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957); Chaplinsky v.
New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); see also Young v. American Mini Theaters,
Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 50 (1976) (allowing an ordinance aimed at avoiding harmful effects of
neighborhood deterioration).
welch, supra note 78, at 89 (footnote omitted) (quoting 413 U.S. at 58, 59).
See id. (contending that both the public nature of the behavior and its harmful
effects are integral to justifications under this theory).
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2. The "Constitutional Populist" Position
The second position, the "constitutional populist" position,
holds that government has an interest in legislating morality per
se.' According to Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for a plurality
in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.," there is a legitimate government
interest in protecting social morality for its own sake under a
state's police power, which has been defined as "the authority to
provide for the public health, safety, and morals."85 Justice Scalia
simply stated the constitutional populism position in a concurrence
in the same case: "Our society prohibits, and all human societies
have prohibited, certain activities not because they harm others but
because they are considered, in the traditional phrase, 'contra bo-
nos mores,' i.e., immoral."86
This theory is "constitutional" because it holds that a law
which enforces a moral code is presumptively valid when it does
not conflict with a specific constitutional prohibition.' The theory
is "populist" because, presumably, the moral code which will serve
as the justificatory basis of such legislation will be that of the
majority.8 Thus, Justice White could aver in Bowers v. Hardwick:
[R]espondent asserts that there must be a rational basis for
the law and there is none in this case other than the pre-
sumed belief of a majority of the electorate in Georgia that
homosexual sodomy is immoral and unacceptable. This is
s The term "constitutional populism" is Welch's. See id. at 68.
501 U.S. 560 (1991).
Id. at 569 (citing 413 U.S. at 61 as authority).
Id. at 575. For another opinion based on this position, see the majority opinion in
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986). Lord Devlin is sometimes cited as a source of
this theory. See the analysis in Anne B. Goldstein, History, Homosexuality, and Political
Values: Searching for the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE LJ.
1073, 1093-96 (1988), for a discussion of the influence of both Devlin and H.L.A. Hart
on this debate. Devlin's position is actually a teleological one. Ultimately, Devlin justifies
state enforcement of morality by arguing that such enforcement increases social cohesion
(and, conversely, that failure to enforce results in social disintegration). For discussions of
this view, see Chai R. Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law: Devlin Re-
visited, 57 U. PrrT. L. REv. 237 (1996), and Kent Greenawalt, Legal Enforcement of
Morality, 85 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 710, 722-23 (1995). But see Robert P. George,
Social Cohesion and the Legal Enforcement of Morals: A Reconsideration of the Hart-
Devlin Debate, 35 AM. J. JuRIs. 15, 31 (1990) (arguing that Devlin addressed interperson-
al integration, not social cohesion).
'" See Welch, supra note 78, at 89.
8 Judge Bork would go further and contend that a law enforcing morality is constitu-
tional because it enforces the morality of the majority. See Dronenburg v. Zech, 741 F.2d
1388, 1397 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding that legislative acts are "conclusively valid" because
they are majoritarian), reh'g denied, 746 F.2d 1579 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
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said to be an inadequate rationale to support the law ....
We do not agree ..
3. The Inadequacy of Both Positions
If the theory used to justify state enforcement of morality is
the teleological theory, then the government calinot prohibit private
homosexual behavior. The teleological theory justifies prohibitions
against "immoral" behavior only when that behavior is public.
Therefore, it cannot justify prohibiting private "immoral" behavior,
such as private, consensual homosexual conduct.
But even if the teleological theory is not found to require
public conduct before "immoral" behavior may be prohibited, pri-
vate, consensual homosexual conduct cannot be prohibited under
the theory because such conduct has no significant harmful effects.
Private, consensual homosexual conduct does not encourage others
to become homosexual (assuming that most Americans would re-
gard this as being undesirable) for two reasons. First, sexual orien-
tation is not something which an individual can choose, whether in
imitation of others or for some other reason.' Second, since the
'9 478 U.S. at 196.
' See Marsha Jones, When Private Morality Becomes Public Concern: Homosexuality
and Public Employment, 24 HOUS. L. REV. 519, 537 (1987) ("[H]omosexuality has not
been proven to be a matter of choice at all, moral or otherwise.... [Tihe evidence is
strong that a person's sexual preference is determined at a very early age and that, once
determined, it is difficult or impossible, to alter."); see also Major Jeffrey S. Davis, Mili-
tary Policy Toward Homosexuals: Scientific, Historical, and Legal Perspectives, 131 MIL
L. REV. 55, 106 (1991) (reviewing the data regarding the causes of sexual orientation and
concluding that "[t]here seem to be a number of causes for the continuum of sexual
orientation, almost all of which occur prior to birth. People do not choose their place on
the continuum of sexual preference"); Suzanne B. Goldberg, Gay Rights Through the
Looking Glass: Politics, Morality and the Trial of Colorado's Amendment 2, 21 FoRDHAM
URB. LJ. 1057, 1065-67 (1994) (recounting testimony by a researcher at the National
Institutes of Health as to genetic determinants of sexual orientation and by a psychiatry
professor at the University of California, Los Angeles, who specializes in human sexuality
and psychosexual development in children, that the accepted view in the medical commu-
nity is that sexual orientation is not consciously chosen). Many other legal articles and
notes have argued that sexual orientation is fixed early, is largely biological, or is im-
mutable. See RIcHARD GREEN, SExUAL SCIENCE AND TiE LAW 85-86 (1992) (discussing
immutability and sexual orientation); see also, e.g., Elvia Rosales Arriola, Sexual Identity
and the Constitution: Homosexual Persons as a Discrete and Insular Minority, 10
WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 143, 154-55 (1988); Richard Delgado, Fact, Norm, and Standard
of Review-The Case of Homosexuality, 10 U. DAYTON L. REv. 575, 583-85 (1985);
Kenneth Lasson, Civil Liberties for Homosexuals: The Law in Limbo, 10 U. DAYTON L
REV. 645, 656-57 (1985); Sharon G. Portwood, Employment Discrimination in the Public
Sector Based on Sexual Orientation: Conflicts Between Research Evidence and the Law,
19 LAw & PSYCHOL. REV. 113 (1995); Stacey Lynne Boyle, Note, Marital Status Classi-
fications: Protecting Homosexual and Heterosexual Cohabitors, 14 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q.
111, 127-28 (1986); Harris M. Miller I1, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal
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behavior in question is private behavior, it is hard to see how it
can exert much influence over any supposed choice as to sexual
orientation among the population generally. This is especially true,
given public disgust with homosexual conduct9' and the limited
deterrent effect of current sodomy laws, due to the difficulty in
detecting the act. Surely, whatever marginal deterrence against
"choosing" homosexual conduct might be lost by invalidating sod-
omy laws would be insignificant compared to the enduring deter-
rence of public distaste of homosexual practices.
Despite popular mythology, consensual homosexual conduct
does not have other significant harmful effects. Homosexuals are
not child molesters: they are proportionately less disposed to molest
children than heterosexuals. 2 Although homosexual men have a
higher rate of HIV infection than the general population because
they tend to have multiple partners and engage in anal inter-
course,93 condom use can largely eliminate the problem. AIDS is
"not a gay disease."94 Generally:
Data from studies using a variety of psychological mea-
sures do not indicate that lesbians and gay men are more
likely than heterosexuals to possess any psychological char-
acteristics that would make them less capable of controlling
their sexual or romantic urges, of refraining from the abuse
of power, of obeying rules and laws, of interacting effec-
tively with others, or of exercising good judgment in han-
dling authority.9'
Protection Heightened Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L.
REV. 797, 817-21 (1984). But see Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of
Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503 (1994)
(arguing that these arguments tend to be somewhat overstated and, in any case, are legal-
ly irrelevant).
" Even among "more supposedly 'liberal' groups, discrimination against gay men and
lesbians is rampant, despite the expression of positive attitudes toward sexual minorities."
Portwood, supra note 90, at 126-27.
9 See David Cramer, Gay Parents and Their Children: A Review of Research and
Practical Implications, 64 J. COUNSELING & DEv. 504, 505 (1986); A. Nicholas Groth &
Thomas S. Gary, Heterosexuality, Homosexuality, and Pedophilia: Sexual Offenses Against
Children and Adult Sexual Orientation, in MALE RAPE: A CASE3ooK OF SEXUAL AG-
GRESSION 143, 146-47 (Anthony M. Sacco, Jr. ed., 1982); Gregory M. Herek, Myths
About Sexual Orientation: A Lawyer's Guide to Social Science Research, 1 L. & SEXUAL-
rry 133, 152-56 (1991).
See Davis, supra note 90, at 70.
't Goldberg, supra note 90, at 1066 (quoting the court testimony of a leading medi-
cal expert on the treatment and care of people afflicted with HIV/A]DS).
' Gregory M. Herek, Sexual Orientation and Military Service: A Social Science Per-
spective, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGisT 538, 541 (1993).
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In sum, "[o]ther than sexual preference, there are no discernible
differences between those who are exclusively heterosexual and
everyone else."
Since private, consensual homosexual conduct is not public
behavior, and since, in any case, it does not have any significant
harmful effects, it cannot be prohibited under a teleological theory
of legal enforcement of morality.
If the theory used to justify state enforcement of morality is
the "constitutional populist" theory, then there are serious questions
as to what constitutes a moral position under this theory and what
weight any position ought to be given.
The disgust or condemnation which a practice arouses does not,
of itself, constitute a moral judgment. Disgust or revulsion can
arise, for example, in matters of taste as well as in matters of
morality.' Such a reaction might be in whole or in part an ex-
pression of moral outrage or an aesthetic response. Thus, if popular
disapprobation toward a practice is to be the foundation for a
practice's suppression, justified by the state's power to enforce
morality, there must be some explanation of the extent to which
the reaction is a moral response." Such an explanation would,
presumably, elucidate the moral ground for that response.99
Davis, supra note 90, at 106.
- Clearly, if we are disgusted or revolted when we see another eat fish eyes or
maggots, we would not necessarily claim that such behavior is immoral. Lord Devlin
argues that to justify eradicating a practice on moral grounds, "general abhorrence" toward
the practice is not enough. One must ask "whether, looking at it calmly and dispassion-
ately, we regard it a vice so abominable that its mere presence is an offence." PATRICK
DEVLIN, THE ENFORCEMENT OF MoRALs 17 (1965).
Otherwise, according to Ronald Dworkin:
It remains possible that the ordinary man could produce no reason for his
view, but would simply parrot his neighbor who in turn parrots him, or that he
would produce a reason which presupposes a general moral position he could
not sincerely or consistently claim to hold. If so, the principles of democracy
we follow do not call for the enforcement of the consensus, for the belief that
prejudices, personal aversions and rationalizations do not justify restricting
another's freedom itself occupies a critical and fundamental position in our
popular morality.
Ronald Dworldn, Lord Devlin and the Enforcement of Morals, 75 YALE LJ. 986, 1001
(1966).
" Since "constitutional populism" denies the need for a teleological ground, the
ground would be deontological, probably arising as a consequence of some idealist,
essentialist, or religious philosophy of morality. As the discussion below indicates, the
Supreme Court has offered no such ground for the legal enforcement of moral prohibi-
tions against sodomy, in particular, or for the enforcement of morality in general. Only
two recent articles have offered a defense of moral prohibitions against sodomy on super-
ficially deontological ground: John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation," 9
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However, it may be that we are asked to accept that the reac-
tion to homosexual behavior is a moral reaction merely because
the authors of the reaction say it is moral, with no further explana-
tion as to the nature and origins of the moral response. In that
case, determining the weight which ought to be given the state's
interest in enforcing whatever notion of morality might lurk be-
neath this unexplained moral gush is problematic." Without an
understanding of how and why the response is a moral response,
that is, understanding what is at stake in the matter, it is impossi-
ble to determine the seriousness of the "immorality" which pro-
voked the response or the gravity of the threat which it poses. If
we are given only the size and intensity of public response as an
indication of the weight of the state's interest, we are reduced to
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETIcs & PU38. POL'Y 11 (1995) and Arthur A. Murphy et al., Gays
in the Military: What About Morality, Ethics, Character, and Honor?, 99 DICK. L. REV.
331 (1995). However, the Murphy et al. article, upon closer examination, never actually
provides any firm ground for its contention that homosexual behavior is essentially im-
moral. It justifies its conclusion on the basis of the "moral" convictions of service person-
nel and the service codes' prohibition of such behavior. See id. at 334, 340. The article
notes that religious codes and social mores are probably the source of these points of
view. See id. at 339. Thus, other than some grounding in an unspecified religious philoso-
phy, the article begs the question as to how its moral judgment is grounded. Fimnis's
article offers an idealist-essentialist philosophical grounding for a moral position against
sodomy. However, the argument is not terribly persuasive because it is ultimately ground-
ed in an assumption that homosexual behavior is morally wrong because contracepted sex
is morally wrong. See Michael J. Perry, The Morality of Homosexual Conduct: A Re-
sponse to John Finnis, 9 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETmCS & PUB. POL'Y 41 (1995), for an
analysis and critique of Finnis's argument which reduces the argument to this assumption.
Such an assumption is not likely to be greeted with widespread cries of joy. For general
discussions of differing approaches to morality and their philosophical grounding, see C.D.
BROAD, FVE TYPES OF ETHICAL THEORY (1956) and MAUHICE MANDELBAUM, THE
PHENOMENOLOGY OF MORAL EXPERIENCE (1955). Finally, Kent Greenawalt notes that
some superficially deontological moral positions are actually reducible to teleological ones:
Claims about moral structures and structures of life seek to answer why the
community may enforce its own morality. Both claims come down to the idea
that members of a community have some interest in preserving forms of life
familiar to them. If the argument is not to reduce either to a bald contention
that a community can enforce its morality or to an assertion that offense justi-
fies restraint, then it must be based on the value of continuity and psychologi-
cal security in people's lives. This is a kind of consequentialist basis, although
one that would need to be strong if it is to override the liberty of people to
choose their own ways of life.
Greenawalt, supra note 86, at 724. If any particular deonotological position is reducible in
this way, then its proponents should cite the harms which follow from a failure to en-
force the moral standards at issue, before we can reasonably be asked to decide whether
those standards ought to be enforced.
" See the distinction between a descriptive and a normative morality and a discussion
of the problems of a moral ground which does not reference norms in Timothy W.
Reinig, Comment, Sin, Stigma & Society: A Critique of Morality and Values In Demo-
cratic Law and Policy, 38 BuFF. L. REv. 859, 878-84 (1990).
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determining the weight of the state's interest by measuring the
popular gonadal firestorm which is its symptom.
The grounding for the moral judgment may be religious. This
was the only philosophical ground referenced by the majority or
the concurrences in Bowers"°' or by the various opinions in
Barnes."r2 If so, there is at least a potential objection that laws
embodying that position conflict with the Establishment Clause."
Even if a religiously-grounded moral judgment does not run afoul
of the Establishment Clause per se, we ought to be cautious about
giving a great deal of weight to any state interest which privileges
a particular religious point of view over other religious points of
view or over secular points of view. This is especially important
with regard to homosexuality, since religious communities, includ-
ing Jewish and Christian religious communities, are sharply divided
over whether or not homosexuality is immoral.'
So far, the proponents of constitutional populism have refer-
enced only religious grounds in elucidating the nature of the state's
interest in enforcing morality. The reference to the "Judeo-Christian
tradition" in Bowers"°5 was so vague that it lent little clarity to
understanding what the state's interest was (and the dangers of
privileging a particular religious point of view caution us against
giving great weight to any state interest explained and justified in
101. See 478 U.S. 186, 196-97 (1986).
202 See 501 U.S. 560, 568-69 (1991).
203. See Reinig, supra note 100, for a discussion of this problem. See also Welch,
supra note 78, at 103 ("The distance between moral belief and religious conviction is
often a very short one: potentially, enforcing morality could become, in effect, enforcing
religion."). However, as Laurence Tribe observes, "that view appears to give too little
weight to the value of allowing religious groups freely to express their convictions in the
political process... and makes the unrealistic assumption that a constitutional ruling
could somehow disentangle religion from future public debate on the question." TRIBE,
supra note 6, § 15-10, at 1350 (footnote omitted).
20" As Michael J. Perry, supra note 99, at 66, notes, "no biblically-based argument
against homosexual conduct falls to be deeply problematic even for those who accept the
authority of the Bible." Not all Jews or Christians, for example, believe that the Judeo-
Christian tradition requires the moral condemnation of homosexual conduct. See JOHN
BOSWELL, CHRISiANIY, SociAL TOLERANCE, AND HoMOsExuALrrY 91-166 (1980) (dis-
cussing the origin and depth of condemnation of homosexuality by Christians and Jews);
RICHARD P. MCBRiEN, 2 CATHOLICIsM 993-97 (rev. ed. 1994) (explaining the Catholic
Church's intolerant position towards gays and lesbians); RICHARD A. McCORMIcK, S.J.,
REFLECTIONS ON MORAL DLEMMAS SiNCE VATICAN H 300 (1989); Gerald D. Coleman,
S.S., The Vatican Statement on Homosexuality, 48 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 727 (1987) (inter-
preting the Catholic Church's stance regarding homosexuality); Jeffrey S. Siker, How to
Decide?: Homosexual Christians, the Bible, and Gentile Inclusion, THEOLOGY TODAY, July
1994, at 219 (questioning the reasoning behind the Catholic Church's position against
homosexual behavior).
10. 478 U.S. at 196.
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such a way). Otherwise, those using the constitutional populist
theory have merely cited a popular outpouring of dislike of homo-
sexuality, have told us that this was a moral response, and have
not told us what that means. There can be precious little "balanc-
ing" if one pan of the scale contains only a syllogistic delirium
tremens.
B. The Private Interest in the Expressive Behavior: Speech, Con-
duct, and Identity
Legally compelling gay citizens to repress homosexual conduct
in private as well as in public causes them psychological and emo-
tional harm generally."°6 This Note will focus, however, on one
particular private interest in expressive homosexual conduct and the
harm which prohibiting that conduct causes: The interest in form-
ing, changing, and maintaining identity.
Any identity is embedded in a particular understanding of
reality.'" Any particular identity makes sense and is legitimized
only in the context of a particular symbolic order, "an all-embrac-
'" Research indicates that significant harm results when gays repress their homosexual
behaviors or when they privately express homosexual behavior but deny their identity or
behavior in public. See ALAN P. BELL & MARTIN S. WEINBERG, HOMOSEXUAITIES: A
STUDY OF DIvERsrrY AMONG MEN AND WOMEN 121-27, 139-215 (1979) (studying the
problems with social and psychological adjustment encountered by gays and lesbians);
LAUD HUMPHREYS, OUT OF THE CLOSETS: THE SOCIOLOGY OF HOMOSEXUAL LIBERATION
(1972); EDWARD A. JONES ET AL., SOCIAL STIGMA: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MARKED RELA-
TIONSHIPS (1984); Sue Kiefer Hamnersmith & Martin S. Weinberg, Homosexual Identity:
Commitment, Adjustment, and Significant Others, 36 SOCIOMETRY 56-79 (1973) (providing
an empirical study of homosexual development).
107. The following analysis of identity and its interrelations with both a particular social
order and a particular understanding of reality is based most immediately upon PETER L.
BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REAITY.: A TREATISE IN
TIE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966). However, the general themes of Berger &
Luckmann's work relied on here (viz., that perception of self, perception of reality, and
the meanings and activities given to the individual by the social order are interdependent)
are neither unique nor currently controversial. The roots of this view of identity go back
at least as far as Edmund Husserl and Max Weber. See REINHARD BENDix, MAX WEBER:
AN INTELLECTUAL PORTRAIT 473-78 (1960) (discussing Weber's role in the development
of phenomenology); Joseph J. Kockelnans, Husserl's Original View on Phenomenological
Psychology, in PHENOMENOLOGY: THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDMUND HUSSERL AND ITS INTER-
PRETATIONS 418 (Joseph J. Kockelnans ed., 1967) (referring to the original work done by
Husserl). Seminal applications of "meaningful intersubjectivity" to the problem of identity
include: CHARLES HORTON COOLEY, HUMAN NATURE AND THE SOCIAL ORDER (1902);
GEORGE HERBERT MEAD, MIND, SELF, & SOCIETY FROM THE STANDPOINT OF A SOCIAL
BEHAVIORALIST (Charles W. Morris ed., 1934); and CARL R. ROGERS, CLIENT-CENTERED
THERAPY (1951). An overview of historical and current psychological and communication
theories adopting this perspective may be found in Charles R. Berger & Nancy J.
Metzger, The Functions of Human Communication in Developing, Maintaining, and Alter-
ing Self- Image, in HANDBOOK OF RHETORICAL AND COMMUNICATION THEORY 273
(Carroll C. Arnold & John Waite Bowers eds., 1984).
404 CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48:381
ing frame of reference, which... constitutes a universe in the
literal sense of the word, because all human experience can... be
conceived of as taking place within it.''"°" An identity as a "wom-
an," "child," "lawyer," or "businesswoman" is possible and takes a
certain shape because some culture tells us that these are possible
things to be and tells us what it means to be these things.'
A social order does not only tell us what identities are possible
and what they mean, but it also justifies these descriptions.'
' BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 96.
'. Clearly, what meaning our culture attaches to being a "woman" is not the same
meaning that it attached to being a "woman" one hundred years ago, when Susan B.
Anthony declared:
[T]he married woman has no right to the custody and control of her person.
The wife belongs to the husbandol .... And since, in the nature of things, the
vast majority of married women never earn a dollar by work outside their
families, or inherit a dollar from their fathers, it follows that from the day of
their marriage to the day of the death of their husbands not one of them ever
has a dollar, except it shall please her husband to let her have it.
Susan B. Anthony, Women's Right to Vote, in THE AMERICAN READER: WORDS THAT
MOVED A NATION 160, 163-64 (Diane Ravitch ed., 1990). What it means to be a "wom-
an" in the United States also differs from what it means to be a "woman" in, for exam-
pie, the Arab world. See RAPHAEL PATAi, THE ARAB MmI 118-42, 327-35 (3d ed. 1983)
(describing Arab women's limited freedom in terms of education, social status, and sexual
expression).
Likewise, an understanding of what it means to be a "child" is culture-specific, and
"the social implications of childhood may vary greatly from one society to another."
BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 136. For example, the Japanese family does
not encourage children to be self-reliant in the American sense, but rather to be depen-
dent. Interlocking dependencies within the ie (family and ritual kinship group) produce on
("indebtedness"), which governs interpersonal relationships. See Dolores Cathcart & Robert
Cathcart, Japanese Social Experience and Concept of Groups, in INTERCULTURAL COMMU-
NiCATION: A READER 186, 188-89 (5th ed. 1986). Such relationships include especially the
oyabun-kobun relationship of protection and support in return for service and loyalty char-
acteristic of father-son or boss-employee. See id. at 189. Dependency also fosters amae,
which (while not entirely translatable) can mean a sweet and warm dependency felt when
one is surrounded by loving family or, as a verb (ameru), to depend on or presume upon
the love of another. See id. at 190-91. If one is an American "child," then, one has an
identity with a very different meaning than that of a Japanese "child." And both under-
standings differ from those of the Arab world. There are no Ambic words for "child,"
"baby," "infant," or "toddler." See PATAI, supra, at 27 (noting that a census-taker cannot
simply ask how many children an individual has, but must separately ask how many
awlffd (boys) and bandt (girls) the individual has). Rather, there are only gender-specific
words for children of differing ages, reflecting tremendous differences in what it means to
be a boy-child or a girl-child. See id. at 27-36. "Child" is not merely a biological rela-
tion, but is also a social construct.
If such apparently biologically-given classifications as "woman" and "child" (and,
equally, "man") are in large part social constructs, then what of such entities as "scien-
tist," "businesswoman" "student," "uncle," "Rotarian," "Methodist," and "psychologist."
These, too, are culture-specific categories, each with its own peculiar meanings which,
when internalized, become part of identity. See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at
138-47 (describing processes of secondary socialization).
"' See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 92-128. For example, we not only
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Identities are inextricably linked with how a culture understands
reality. To be an "employee" presumes one system of social types
and way of understanding the world; to be a "proletarian" pre-
sumes other types and another way of understanding the world.
Similarly, to be "lesbian/gay," "homosexual," "queer," or a "per-
vert" each presumes differing social types and differing ways of
understanding the world. Each implicates a different meaningful
reality.
If an identity is embedded in a particular understanding of
reality, then acquiring or changing identity implies acquiring or
changing a way of looking at the world in which identity is em-
bedded. The processes by which identity is acquired or changed are
long or arduous or both."'
know that there are lawyers and what it means to be a lawyer, but we can find justifica-
tions for why there ought to be lawyers. Such justifications are tied to justifications for
the society's institution of law, which are in turn tied to society's beliefs about justice,
order, human nature, and so on. Compare, for example, the differing descriptions of and
justifications for law in RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986), LON FULLER, THm
MORALrrY OF LAW (1964), H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961), with Norman
Kretzmann, Lex Iniusta Non Est Lex: Laws on Trial in Aquinas' Court of Conscience, 33
AM. J. JuRs. 99 (1988).
Similarly, justifications of what it means to be a "woman," "man," or "child," (or
"scientist," "businesswoman," "student," "uncle," "Rotarian," "Methodist," or "psycholo-
gist") are also embedded in a larger understanding of reality. They implicate theories of
what it means to be human, about humanity's place in the universe, about humanity's
relationship to a god, and about the nature of the universe. See BERGER & LUCKMANN,
supra note 107, at 96 ("The symbolic universe is conceived of as the matrix of all so-
cially objectivated and subjectively real meanings; the entire historic society and the entire
biography of the individual are seen as events taking place within this universe.").
. Identity may be acquired through primary socialization, sudden conversion, or evo-
lutionary change. Primary socialization is an intense, emotionally-charged process by which
a child first acquires identity. See BERGER & LUCKMAIN, supra note 107, at 129-37 (de-
scribing primary socialization generally).
Sudden conversion alters identity by subjecting candidates for conversion to an ana-
log of primary socialization. See generally Walsh, supra note 39; James F. Walsh, Jr.,
Rhetoric in the Conversion of Maoist Insurgency Cadres: Rhetoric and the Conceptual
Component of Conversion in Radical Social Movements. Part 11, WORLD COMm., Spring
1990, at 131 [hereinafter Walsh, Conceptual Component]; James F. Walsh, Jr., Rhetoric in
the Conversion of Maoist Insurgency Cadres: Rhetoric and the Emotional Component of
Conversion in Radical Social Movements. Part IlI, WORLD COMM., Fall 1990, at I [here-
inafter Walsh, Emotional Component] (providing a case study of such a conversion). Sud-
den conversion is a rigorous, exhausting, and sometimes violent process designed to break
down the candidate's original world view and identity and replace them with a new world
view and identity. See Walsh, Conceptual Component, supra.
Identity may also be transformed more slowly, over years. See James F. Walsh, Jr.,
Social Movements and Social Reality: Rhetorical Discourse in Revolutionary Guerrilla
Warfare 287-329 (1982) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Purdue University) (on file with
the Purdue University Library) [hereinafter Walsh, Social Movements] (discussing a case
study in the gradual transformation of revolutionaries' world view and sense of identity).
Although this process is not necessarily as intense as primary socialization or sudden
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Any process of identity acquisition or identity change includes
certain essential elements."' Three essential elements of identity
acquisition or change are relevant to the present discussion: the
presence of one or more "significant others," emotional reorienta-
tion, and participation in a plausibility structure.
Primary socialization, by which we first acquire an identity as
children, is controlled and mediated by "significant others," usually
parents."3  These significant others are persons for whom the
conversion, it is still an emotional process. See, e.g., id at 292-97, 324-28 (discussing
how revolutionaries arouse hatred and resentment in those whom they seek to convert).
"' Generally, processes of identity acquisition or change can be said to have three
components: a conceptual component, a social component, and an emotional component.
See Walsh, supra note 39, at 32-37; Walsh, Conceptual Component, supra note 111, at
136-45; Walsh, Emotional Component, supra note 111, at 6-13. The model described in
these articles is synthesized from two very different approaches to the problem of conver-
sion, one phenomenological and the other neurophysiological.
The conceptual component of identity acquisition or change consists primarily of an
ideology. See Walsh, Conceptual Component, supra note 111, at 134. An ideology gives
believers a cognitive map for understanding the social world. It may include types of
actors (entrepreneurs/capitalist exploiters), actions (defending democracy/imperialism), and
characteristics (working class/proletarian) for viewing and understanding the world. See id.
This typology must be made available to potential converts as part of the conceptual
component. When it is internalized by the candidate, it becomes the believer's subjective
reality. See id.
The social component consists of participation in an appropriate "plausibility struc-
ture." See Walsh, supra note 39, at 31. A plausibility structure is the ideology's system
of types given concrete form. See id. For example, a fully-functioning free enterprise
system or a fully functioning Marxist-Leninist system would be the ideal plausibility struc-
tures for those respective ideologies. A plausibility structure is the world of the ideology
made real so far as this is possible. See id. For a description of measures which may be
taken to provide surrogates for plausibility structures when participation in the complete
structure is not possible, see BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 158-59.
The emotional component consists of emotional experiences which help fix identity.
Although we tend to regard emotion and cognition as two very separate things, cognitions
are implicated in affective states, and affective states guide cognitions. According to
Heidegger, "[a] state-of-mind always has its understanding." MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING
AN TIME 182 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson eds. & trans., 1962). An emotion
includes a particular understanding of a thing, as Heidegger's analysis of fear demon-
strates. See id. 30, at 179-82. Similarly, a mood "colors the whole world and... the
specific ways things and possibilities show up as mattering." HuBERT L. DRanEI's, BEING-
IN-THE-WORLD: A COMMENTARY ON HEIDEGGER'S BEING AND TIME, DI ION I 174
(1991). Heidegger is hardly unique in insisting that affect is cognitive. Aristotle observed
over two thousand years ago that "things do not appear the same to those who love and
those who hate, nor to those who are angry and those who are mild." ARISTOTE, THE
ART OF RHErOIUc, reprinted in 22 ARISTOTLE IN TWENTY-THREE VOLUMES 1377b, 4, at
171 (John Henry Freese trans., 1982) (although the translation provided here is by the
author of this Note). Similarly, modern cognitive psychology holds that "emotions are
perceptual processes ... in the full sense of processes that have definite cognitive con-
tent." R.W. Leeper, The Motivational and Perceptual Properties of Emotions as Indicating
Their Fundamental Character and Role, in FEELINGS AND EMOTIONS: THE LOYOLA SYM-
POSIUM 151, 156 (M.B. Arnold ed., 1970).
- See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 131-32.
[Vol. 48:381
1998] FIRST AMEDMENT & HOMOSEXUAL CONDUCT 407
child feels emotional attachment. Indeed, "there is good reason to
believe that without such emotional attachment to the significant
others the learning process would be difficult if not impossi-
ble."'1 4 Sudden conversion, too, includes persons for whom the
candidate for conversion comes to feel an emotional attachment
and identification."' These "significant others" mediate the new
world view which the candidate is to acquire. Even in gradual
transformation of identity, the person to be transformed identifies
with individuals who help mediate the new way of looking at the
world and at self."6
An important part of the acquisition or transformation of identi-
ty is emotion. " ' This includes emotions directed at other persons
and things in ways congruent with the ideology in which identity
is to be based; for example, an entrepreneur admires free enterprise
and loathes socialism. It also includes feelings of emotional attach-
ment for a person or persons who will serve as a "significant oth-
er" and help mediate the internalization of ideology necessary to
acquire identity. An emotion is a way of being conscious of the
world that orients one toward the world in a particular way."' If
"" BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 131. Significant others mediate between
the child and the system of social beliefs, attitudes, values, and norms which the child
must absorb to become socialized. See id. Implicitly and explicitly, their words and ac-
tions tell the child who the child is, what the world is like, how the child should behave,
and why these things are as they are: "Their definitions of his situation are posited for
him as objective reality." Id. The child comes to identify with significant others as the
child feels emotional attachment for them. See id. at 131-32. When identification occurs,
the child internalizes the significant others' view of who and what the child is, their ways
of looking at the world, and their ways of behaving. See id. at 131-34. In other words,
the child acquires an identity, a socially-shared world view, and a set of socially-approved
behavioral norms through attachment for, and identification with, significant others.
1t5. See Walsh, Emotional Component, supra note 111, at 12. The "positive and depen-
dent feelings [which] resemble childhood feelings for parents" essentially transform the
indoctrinator and other group members into "significant others" for the candidate for con-
version. Id.
"- See, e.g., JF. Walsh, Jr., An Approach to Dyadic Communication in Historical
Social Movements: Dyadic Communication in Maoist Insurgent Mobilization, 53 COMM.
MONOGRAPHS 1, 5-8 (1986) (describing the methods of creating identification between the
population to be transformed and revolutionary cadres).
"'* See Walsh, Emotional Component, supra note 111. For a description of this func-
tion of emotion, see generally Michael J. Hyde, Emotion and Human Communication: A
Rhetorical, Scientific, and Philosophical Picture, 32 CoMM. Q. 120 (1984) [hereinafter
Hyde, Emotion and Human Communication], Michael J. Hyde, The Experience of Anxiety:
A Phenemenological Investigation, 66 QJ. SPEECH 140 (1980), and Michael . Hyde &
Craig R. Smith, Rethinking "The Public": The Role of Emotion in Being-with-Others, 77
QJ. SPEECH 446 (1991).
"L See Hyde, Emotion and Human Communication, supra note 117, at 128 ("The
experience of emotion is a fundamental way of apprehending the world."). When the
emotion results from the unexpected, "[e]motional consciousness is an experience that
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emotions are maintained and "become moods encouraging people
to interpret and understand the world in specific ways, these moods
take on an ideological value."'"9
A successful acquisition of identity also depends on at least
minimal participation in some plausibility structure appropriate to
the ideology which is to be acquired by the candidate. Plausibility
structures are objective entities which support systems of belief.
The ideal plausibility structure for a capitalist ideology is a fully-
functioning capitalist economic and social system; the ideal plausi-
bility structure for a Marxist-Leninist ideology is a fully-function-
ing Marxist-Leninist economic and social system, and so on. Plau-
sibility structures constantly reassure believers who participate in
them that their way of looking at things is, indeed, the way reality
really is." ° By participating in an appropriate plausibility struc-
ture, the candidate's new system of belief is illustrated, validated,
and reinforced.
Identity is problematic for homosexuals because the only identi-
ties offered by straight society are undesirable.' This has nega-
tive effects both on the stability of identity and on cognition gener-
ally 12
2
transforms the world." Id. at 129. When we experience emotions, we can orient ourselves
toward the world in a new way, moving "out of the ordinary ... to experience and
understand differently any perceived object or situation." Id.
119. Id.
According to Berger and Luckmann:
Subjective reality is ... always dependent upon specific plausibility struc-
res.. .. One can maintain one's self-identification as a man of importance
only in a milieu that confirms this identity; one can maintain one's Catholic
faith only if one retains one's significant relationship with the Catholic commu-
nity; and so forth.... As long as he remains within the plausibility structure,
the individual feels himself to be ridiculous whenever doubts about the reality
concerned arise subjectively. He knows that others would smile at him if he
voiced them. He can silently smile at himself, mentally shrug his shoul-
ders--and continue to exist within the world thus sanctioned.
BERGER AND LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 154-55. A key notion is that "others would
smile at him" if doubts about the shared way of looking at things were voiced. The
reality which we subjectively inhabit is a shared subjective reality. In our everyday inter-
actions, that reality is reflected back at us as a matter of course in the casual, taken-for-
granted behavior of the people around us. Thus, one individual's way of looking at the
world is reaffirmed by casual interactions with other individuals who share the same sub-
jective reality. See id.
. See Mark Strasser, Unconstitutional? Don't Ask; If It Is, Don't Tell: On Deference,
Rationality, and the Constitution, 66 U. Coo. L. REv. 375, 452-56 (1995), and Harris
M. Miller II, Note, An Argument for the Application of Equal Protection Heightened
Scrutiny to Classifications Based on Homosexuality, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 821-25
(1984), for brief descriptions of the meaning of gay and lesbian identification to much of
straight society.
" An individual offered only negative identities by a society and who becomes re-
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The solution to the problem of homosexual identity is, first, to
create stable, positive homosexual identities as alternatives to the
negative identities offered by society and, second, to internalize
them."is Creating such identities requires definitions of reality
which run counter to those accepted in society.124 Internalizing an
alternative identity, as already noted, requires a certain cognitive
component (here, alternative definitions of reality which explain
and justify the new identity) and certain emotional and social com-
ponents.
Sexual conduct is uniquely situated to help realize the emotion-
al and social components needed for internalization of alternative
homosexual identities and to maintain those identities once they are
internalized. Acts of love between homosexual partners help create
the feelings of attachment and dependence needed to establish a
"significant other."'" Sexual acts also help generate, shape, and
maintain strong and appropriate emotions needed for the creation or
sentful of them will not be socialized successfully:.
iThat is, there will be a high degree of asymmetry between the socially de-
fined reality in which he is de facto caught, as in an alien world, and his own
subjective reality, which reflects that world only very poorly. The asymmetry
will, however, have no cumulative structural consequences because it lacks a
social base within which it could crystallize into a counter-world, with its own
institutionalized cluster of counter-identities. The unsuccessfully socialized indi-
vidual himself is socially predefined as a profiled type-the cripple, the bastard,
the idiot, and so on. Consequently, whatever contrary self-identifications may at
times arise in his own consciousness lack any plausibility structure that would
transform them into something more than ephemeral fantasies.
BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 165-66. The result is a socially-provided iden-
tity which is resented and rejected without any stable, positive identity available as an
alternative (since counter-identities lack the plausibility structure necessary to give them
stability). See id. at 147-56. But since identity is inextricably entangled with the world
view which accompanies it, instability in one's identity necessarily results in instability in
one's world view generally. See id. at 149-52; see also Walsh, Social Movements, supra
note 111, at 122-23 (pointing out that the consequences of rejection of available identities
can include anomie). Consequently, when a society offers an individual only negative
identities and the individual struggles against them, both identity and cognition are likely
to suffer instability.
12 See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 166-67.
'" See id. at 166. See generally Walsh, Conceptual Component, supra note 111 (dis-
cussing the reasons why the definition of reality supporting the new identity must negate
the old definition of reality). Thus, a socially accepted definition of reality which supports
negative homosexual identities (for example, God created a natural order which is funda-
mentally heterosexual and deviation from that order is sinful) must be altered in some
way so as to support a positive homosexual identity.
'12 See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 131-32, 157-58 (describing the
importance of significant others in the alteration of identity); see also Walsh, Emotional
Component, supra note 111, at 4-6 (explaining how emotional arousal centered around a
particular individual can transform that individual into a significant other).
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alteration of identity."l Finally, lovemaking between homosexual
partners is itself a plausibility structure which affirms and reifies a
positive homosexual identity."2 7
In sum, private homosexual conduct can be of unique impor-
tance to those who engage in it. It can provide two of the three
requirements necessary to support a stable, positive identity to
persons who are likely to be in sore need of one. Consequently, it
is expressive conduct which should not be easily trammeled.
C. Balancing the State's Interest in Prohibiting the Expressive
Conduct and the Private Interest in the Expressive Conduct
Any reasonable balancing of the state's interesting in prohibit-
ing expressive homosexual conduct and the private interest in the
conduct must conclude that the state's interest is far outweighed by
the private interest involved.
To call the state's interest in prohibiting homosexual conduct
weak would be a kindness: It is hopelessly incoherent. The state's
position cannot be explained or justified using a teleological theory,
because the expressive behavior in question is neither public nor
has any necessary negative effects. Thus, a "constitutional populist"
theory must justify the prohibition. But the nature and weight of
the state's interest under such a theory are confused. Advocates of
prohibition cite popular revulsion toward homosexuality without
explaining the connection between this response and anything re-
sembling a system of morality. They also cite the "Judeo-Christian
tradition" while steadfastly ignoring the divided contemporary Jew-
ish and Christian views as to the morality of homosexuality. What
the state's moral interest is, how it is justified, or the weight which
that interest should have are unknown and unexplained.
"" See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 131-32, 157-58 (describing the need
for emotional arousal in the transformation of identity). It is for this reason that some
philosophers consider emotional expression, particularly sexual expression, to be more
important to generating identity than more rational expression. See Arthur Aron & Elaine
Aron, Love and Sexuality, in SEXUALITY IN CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS 42 (Kathleen
McKinney & Susan Sprecher eds., 1991).
17 See BERGER & LUCKmANN, supra note 107, at 147-59 (explaining how ritual and
routine affirms and sustains identity). Talking about and engaging in sex is essential to a
person wanting to explore, discover, announce, and/or renounce her orientation. Since
orientation is the fundamental component of homosexual identity, sexual conduct is essen-
tial to homosexual identity transformation. See Vivienne C. Cass, The Implications of
Homosexual Identity Formation for the Kinsey Model and Scale of Preference, in Homo-
SEXUALrrY/HETEROSEXUALrY: CONCEPTS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 239 (David P.
McWhirter et al. eds., 1990). For discussion of the distinctive nature of sexual orientation,
see also Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the
Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503, 519-20 (1994).
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If the state interest in prohibiting homosexual conduct is, at
best, weak, the private interest in the expression is extremely
strong. In Planned Parenthood of Southeast Pennsylvania v.
Casey," Justice O'Connor wrote: "At the heart of liberty is the
right to define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. Beliefs about these
matters could not define the attributes of personhood were they
formed under the compulsion of the State." '
Justice O'Connor was writing of the liberty interest under the
Fourteenth Amendment. Her words, however, are even more apro-
pos of First Amendment protection for expressive conduct which
forms, maintains, and alters identity. Such conduct, in the most
literal way imaginable, does define "existence .... meaning, ....
the universe, and.., the mystery of human life." Identity defines
who we are, and it is intertwined with a world view which defines
for each of us the world beyond us.
At stake for many of those who engage in expressive homosex-
ual conduct is the ability to form a stable identity, to effectively
maintain a world-view which contradicts majoritarian assertions of
fact and value, and to live fully in passionate, anchoring relation-
ships which help hold identity and world-view together. Further,
those who contend that strong constitutional protection should only
be extended to public political discourse should note that identity
and world-view form the cognitive ground upon which individuals
build theory, including political theory."3 These are interests
which deserve robust constitutional protection. They should not be
sacrificed for the sake of an incoherent moral claim which smacks
more of bigotry than reason.
IlI. CONCLUSION
This Note has examined only one facet of why homosexual
conduct is important to those who engage in it: It can serve an
essential role in realizing identity, maintaining a world-view, and
establishing "significant others." There are, of course, other reasons
why such conduct is important that this Note has not examined,
such as self-expression per se. This Note leaves to other scholars
examination of these additional reasons for protecting homosexual
conduct as expressive conduct. However, even this limited explora-
,n 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
2. Id. at 851.
'3 See BERGER & LUCKMANN, supra note 107, at 82-104 (discussing the relationships
between theories, including political theories, and the "symbolic universe" or world-view).
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tion of the subject must conclude that private homosexual conduct
is expressive conduct which deserves constitutional protection,
given the strength of the private interests in the conduct and the
failure of the state to elucidate any clear interest in prohibiting that
conduct.
One commentator recently noted:
When one considers the strength with which claims of
religious or sexual preferences are held and their resistance
to change by rational discourse or other decision-making
processes, one senses that these are matters particularly ill
suited for resolution by democratic voting or scientific
investigation.... [Mlajority rule does not fit well with
those kinds of beliefs; compromise does not fit a great deal
better, and imposition by legal authority from above on
such beliefs is not likely to be taken with equanimity.
Consequently, government incursions into these areas tend
to have a more devastating effect on individuals than intru-
sions on other, less defining areas.'
Prohibition will not stop private homosexual conduct, will not
convince the unconverted that the conduct is wrong, is not needed
to "prevent the spread" of homosexuality, and no longer expresses
the overwhelming moral consensus of the nation. Given the dam-
age that prohibition inflicts on a minority of Americans, it is long
past time that advocates of prohibition put aside their interest in
fiddling with other people's sex lives and find some useful (or at
least less destructive) way of occupying their leisure.
J.F. WALSH, JR.t
'3 David B. Salmons, Comment, Toward a Fuller Understanding of Religious Exer-
cise: Recognizing the Identity-Generative and Expressive Nature of Religious Devotion, 62
U. CM. L. REV. 1243, 1258 (1995) (footnote omitted).
t The author wishes to thank Professor Mel Durchslag for his advice and support in
the preparation of this Note.
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